Rough set theory can be considered as the foundation of various kinds of deductive reasoning. In this paper, the authors do some logical investigations about the possibility of using partial approximation of sets as semantics of a three-valued partial logic which use one-argument predicate parameters without quantification. As a consequence of using the lower and upper approximation of sets, approximative functors appear in object language. Functors and three-valued semantics give a real possibility to investigate how to alter valid logical laws.
Introduction
In recent years, a number of theoretical attempts have appeared in order to approximate sets. For example, rough set theory was originally proposed by Pawlak (see in [1] , [2] ), its different generalizations (see, e.g. in [3] )
In this paper we go on our logical investigations about the possibility of using different systems of set approximation in a quantification-free logical semantics. First we want to show some unexpected semantic properties of approximation, and later we define some necessary condition to avoid the lack of connection betvenn the evaluation results of different approximation.
Partial approximation of sets
In the following definition a most fundamental (and very general) notion of an approximation space is given. This core notion serves as the set-theoretical back- ground of semantics of partial logic with approximative operators. Definition 2.1. The ordered 5-tuple U, B, D B , l, u is a general partial approximation space if 6. The set F orm (the set of formulae) is given by the following inductive definition:
(a) if P ∈ P(1) and x ∈ V ar, then P (x) ∈ F orm, and
7. The set Snt (the set of sentences) is given by the following definition: F orm ⊂ Snt and if F ∈ F orm, then ↑ F ∈ Snt, and ↓ F ∈ Snt.
Interpretations
Let L = LC, V ar, Con, T, F orm, Snt be a language with approximative functors.
2. is a function such that
Function v is an assignment relying on the interpretation U, if
Logically relevant general partial approximation space
Tools (the members of set T) determine a logically relevant general partial approximation space with respect to a given interpretation.
u is a logically relevant general partial approximation space with Pawlakian approximation pair generated by set T of tools with respect to the interpretation, if B = { (T ) : T ∈ T}.
Semantic Rules
Some unexpected properties of partial propositional logic based . . .
is a function such that Figure 1 shows the lower approximation of P . The oviform area in the middle represents the truth set of P , while the rectangles illustrate the truth sets of tools. Using the lower approximation, only the rectangle completely inside the oviform area belongs to the turth set of P . Comparing figure 1 with 2, we see, that the approximate false set of P is the same. The truth set of P now is approximated with the tools represented by the union of the three big rectangles.
If
P ∈ P red, then [[P ↑ ]] v = s, where s : U → {0, 1, 2} is a function such that s(u) =      1 if u ∈ u( [[P ]] v ) 0 if u ∈ l(U \ u( [[P ]] v )) 2 otherwise U [[P ↑ ]] = 1 U [[P ↑ ]] = 0
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5. If P ∈ P(0) and • is a sentence functor (• ∈ {↑, ↓}) or missing, then
6. if A, B ∈ F orm and • is a sentence functor (• ∈ {↑, ↓}), or missing
Central semantic notions
Let L = LC, V ar, Con, T, F orm, Snt be a given language with approximative functors, Γ ⊆ Snt be a set of sentence and A ∈ F orm be a senence. Let PR be a set of possible representations of language L.
1. Γ is satisfiable with respect to the set PR if it has a model in PR.
2.
A is a weak semantic consequence of Γ with respect to the set PR (in notation Γ
, A is not false in any PR-model of Γ).
Some unexpected properties of partial propositional logic based . . . 
A is irrefutable with respect to the set PR (in notation
PR
2.
A is valid with respect to the set PR (in notation
General and approximative laws

Law of non-contradiction
In classical case, the set {A, ¬A} is unsatisfiable where A ∈ F orm. The law it is still valid, using the lower or upper approximative sentence functors, so
• the set {↑ A, ↑ ¬A} is unsatisfiable, and
• the set {↓ A, ↓ ¬A} is unsatisfiable.
But in case when different sentence functors appears before formula A
• the set {↑ A, ↓ ¬A} is satisfiable, and
• the set {↓ A, ↑ ¬A} is satisfiable.
Theorem 3.6. The sets {↑ A; ↓ ¬A}, and {↓ A; ↑ ¬A} are satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose, that we have a P ∈ P(1) one-argument predicate parameter. We are able to construct an interpretation U, and an assignment v such that there is an u ∈ U such that u / ∈ l(
The evaluation results of the formulas ↑ P (x) and ↓ P (x) (with respect to U, and v) are different: 
Modus ponens
In the classical case {(A ⊃ B), A} w B and so the set {(A ⊃ B), A, ¬B} is unsatisfiable, where A, B ∈ F orm. The law it is still valid, using the lower or upper approximative sentence functors, so
• {↓ (A ⊃ B), ↓ A} w ↓ B, and so the set {↓ (A ⊃ B), ↓ A, ↓ ¬B} is unsatisfiable,
• {↑ (A ⊃ B), ↑ A} w ↑ B, and so the set {↑ (A ⊃ B), ↑ A, ↑ ¬B} is unsatisfiable.
But with different sentence functors (based on the idea described in Theorem 3.6)
• {↓ (A ⊃ B), ↓ A} w ↑ B and so the set {↓ (A ⊃ B), ↓ A, ↑ ¬B} is satisfiable,
• {↑ (A ⊃ B), ↑ A} w ↓ B and so the set {↑ (A ⊃ B), ↑ A, ↓ ¬B} is satisfiable.
Necessary conditions to use the approximation
After we showed the lack of connection between the formulae with different sentence functors, now we give a necessary condition to satisfy
where A is an arbitrary formula and ∆, ∇ are different sentence functors, or one of them could missing.
• Let P ∈ P(1) and x is a variable. The necessary conditions above are satisfied, where ∆ =↓ and ∇ =↑ .
